Since the 1990s it has become more or less conventional wisdom in most European countries that the predominant passive character of social policy should be replaced by more active measures. The welfare state that was built up in the post-Second World War period in Western Europe might have been quite successful in reducing poverty and providing income protection, but it proved unable to cope with the sharp rise of unemployment and the rapidly increasing numbers of benefi t claimants after the oil shocks of the 1970s. Moreover, in the 1990s it became widely accepted that the rising number of benefi ciaries was at least partly caused -or aggravated -by the passive character of the welfare state. From a failing solution to the problem of a malfunctioning economy, the welfare state became the problem itself.
During the 1990s, two main approaches were advocated to tackle the problems of the welfare state. The fi rst was the (neo)liberal approach of welfare state retrenchment. To put it bluntly, this approach tries to remedy the fl aws of the welfare state by reducing it and creating more room for the market and the private provision of income insurance. The main weakness of this approach is, of course, that it neglects the reasons why the welfare state was introduced in the fi rst place, that is, to compensate for market failures. Shifting the responsibility for social protection from the state back to the market can give rise again to the unfavourable social consequences of market failures, such as high poverty levels, large income disparities and social exclusion of weaker groups. The second approach boils down to activating the welfare state. This approach was inspired by the alleged success of the Nordic welfare states, which for a long time were able to combine a high standard of social protection, low unemployment rates and high labour participation rates. The success of these welfare states is often attributed to their active labour market policies, which stimulate and support the unemployed to get back to work and facilitate the integration of all citizens in the labour market. During the 1990s, however, Sweden, the Scandinavian welfare state par excellence, experienced a deep economic crisis and record levels of unemployment, which forced the Swedish government to reform its welfare state, cut back expenses and reduce the generosity of social benefi ts. Although the Swedish economy has recovered, it is still questioned whether its welfare state will be sustainable in the end (Lindbeck 1997) .
If the liberal approach guarantees the economic sustainability of the welfare state at the risk of increasing poverty and income insecurity, and the Nordic approach safeguards social protection without being sustainable in the long run, the obvious way out seems to combine the two approaches. This could be achieved by creating more room for a well-functioning self-regulating labour market on the one hand, while maintaining social protection and introducing activation measures on the other. Recently, a labour market policy concept has been developed that intends to achieve this. This so-called fl exicurity approach is now an offi cial goal of the European Union (EU), calling on the member states to 'promote fl exibility combined with employment security' (EC 2005, p. 5) and 'convergence of views on the balance between fl exibility and employment security, or fl exicurity' (EC 2006, pp. 75-6) . In 2007, the European Commission proposed a set of 'common principles of fl exicurity' (EC 2007) .
The fl exicurity concept is not fully developed yet, nor is there a universally accepted defi nition. An important characteristic of the concept is that it refers to particular goals, namely fl exibility and security, and not to particular instruments or measures. This probably explains its present popularity, since it fi ts nicely with the strategy of the open method of coordination (OMC), currently the common method for social policy in the EU. The OMC is tantamount to stating goals only, by means of so-called guidelines, and leaving it up to the EU member states to devise the measures to implement these goals. This allows each member state to choose the policy mix that fi ts its specifi c problems and circumstances best.
As pointed out by Wilthagen et al. (2003) the terms 'fl exibility' and 'security' have various meanings. They distinguish four elements of fl exibility and four kinds of security, and theoretically there can be 16 diff erent combinations of fl exibility and security. This makes the concept very broad and not very manageable for practical purposes. From the perspective of the welfare state debate, however, the most important elements of security seem to be income and employment security, 1 and the most important element of fl exibility the movement of individuals between jobs and between employment and non-employment (including unemployment and positions outside the labour market). 2 This is also the position taken by the European Commission, which states: 'Flexicurity can be defi ned, more precisely, as a policy strategy to enhance, at the same time and in a deliberate way, the fl exibility of labour markets, work organizations and labour relations on the one hand, and security -employment security and income security -on the other' (EC 2007) .
Still, numerous policies aff ect these two kinds of security and this particular kind of fl exibility. The literature, however, focuses on three categories of policies which specifi cally aim at a particular element of fl exicurity. First of all, social security, and in particular unemployment benefi ts, is an important means for safeguarding income security by providing a social benefi t to those who lose their job and/or are involuntarily out of work. Second, active labour market policies aim at promoting employment security, by enhancing the chances of fi nding a (new) job for those who lose their job or who enter the labour market. Third, labour market regulation generally reduces the fl exibility of the labour market by restricting the unfettered working of the market. Deregulation, such as relaxing employment protection legislation, might be a means to enhance labour market fl exibility and increase the fl ows between employment and non-employment.
In the next three sections, we successively discuss these three policy instruments to enhance fl exicurity, and show that none of these on its own is suffi cient to realize the intended combination of fl exibility and security. Consequently, we discuss whether a combination of these measures yields better results and whether this might be called a 'golden triangle' of social policy.
THE CORE OF SOCIAL PROTECTION: UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
At the core of each welfare state is a system of social security that provides income replacement for those who are involuntarily out of work and cannot, or are not required to, fall back on another source of income (such as capital income or income support from family members). All welfare states include a system of unemployment insurance, which provides either an earnings-related or a fl at-rate cash benefi t to employees who are (involuntarily) dismissed. There is a massive literature on the impact of these unemployment benefi ts on both income security and labour market fl exibility. The general conclusion is that unemployment benefi ts enhance income security at the cost of reducing the outfl ow from unemployment to employment.
To be more precise, there is ample empirical evidence that unemployment benefi ts reduce income disparities by transferring income from employed to unemployed workers (see Korpi and Palme 1998) . It should be noted, however, that most empirical studies look at the direct impact of social benefi ts on income disparities by comparing the inequality of pre-tax and pre-transfer market incomes with the inequality of post-tax and post-transfer incomes. In other words, they compare the existing income disparities with the counterfactual in which there would be no social benefi ts, but everything else would be the same. This assumption is, of course, highly implausible, since most people would change their behaviour if they were no longer protected against the income loss caused by unemployment. One way to analyse these behavioural responses is by building a complex micro-econometric model, which includes individual choices between work and leisure time and the budget restriction that individuals face, due to the social security and tax system. However, these models are very sensible to the underlying assumptions and the estimated labour supply elasticities, which casts substantial doubt on the reliability of the outcomes of such models. An alternative method to study behavioural responses to variations in the social security system is by comparing diff erent countries. Such cross-country comparisons are, however, hampered by the fact that countries diff er in many respects, which makes it diffi cult to attribute income disparities to one particular element. Nevertheless, there is convincing empirical evidence that a more generous social security system reduces income inequality, even if one takes the behavioural responses of the population into account (Moller et al. 2003) .
There are also numerous studies on the impact of unemployment benefi ts on the fl exibility of the labour market, in particular the outfl ow from unemployment to work (some recent studies are Røed and Zhang 2003; Jenkins and García-Serrano 2004; Lalive and Zweimüller 2004; Pollmann-Schult and Büchel 2005) . In a neoclassical economic framework it is selfevident that unemployment benefi ts cause a rise of the unemployment level, since the benefi t itself reduces the costs of unemployment for the individual. Benefi t recipients will search less intensively or raise their reservation wage (the lowest wage at which they are prepared to accept a job), which will prolong their unemployment duration, elevating the unemployment level. However, this simple economic model may not be very relevant in practice, since in the real world eligibility to unemployment benefi ts is subject to specifi c qualifying conditions, including the obligation to apply for jobs and to accept a job off er (Atkinson and Micklewright 1991) .
Most of the empirical studies use micro-level data to analyse the impact of unemployment benefi ts on the behaviour of individual unemployed persons. These studies usually fi nd relatively small and sometimes negligible eff ects of the benefi t level on unemployment duration or the outfl ow to work. However, they often fi nd much larger eff ects of a change of the benefi t level, for example due to expiration of entitlements (for an overview, see Holmlund 1998) . Moreover, sanctions (such as benefi t reductions when not searching intensively enough) reduce the duration of unemployment and increasing the monitoring intensity even increases the exit probability of the non-sanctioned unemployed (Lalive et al. 2005) .
Macro-studies usually take the form of cross-country comparisons of unemployment rates whereby the level of unemployment, among other factors, is related to the social security system. This is mostly accomplished by taking the so-called replacement rate (the benefi t level as a percentage of the average wage) and/or the maximum benefi t duration as a measure of the generosity of unemployment benefi ts. These cross-country studies are subject to the same criticism as studies that attempt to estimate the impact on income inequality, since it is very diffi cult to disentangle the eff ect of unemployment benefi ts from other factors. Nevertheless, there is some evidence of a positive relationship between the benefi t generosity and the unemployment rate and the share of long-term unemployed in particular (Layard et al. 1991; Nickell et al. 2005) .
In sum, there is broad agreement that a system of unemployment benefi ts reduces income inequality by narrowing the income gap between the employed and the unemployed population. There is less convincing evidence that unemployment benefi ts enhance unemployment by prolonging unemployment duration and reducing the outfl ow from unemployment to work.
THE NEW ELEMENT: ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICIES
One reason why international comparisons do not show a strong relationship between unemployment insurance generosity and unemployment rates is that, for a long time, the Scandinavian countries succeeded in combining a generous social security system with low unemployment levels and small numbers of long-term unemployed. This success is often attributed to the active labour market policies that are carried out in these countries in addition to the social security system (sometimes called passive labour market policies) (Calmfors et al. 2002) . Various measures to help the unemployed back to work are assumed to mitigate or even fully off set the unfavourable eff ects of generous benefi ts on unemployment.
These measures include job brokerage, counselling, training, job sharing, direct job creation and specifi c measures for youth or for the disabled. If participation in these programmes is a precondition for receiving a benefi t, these measures might also compensate for the disincentives caused by generous unemployment benefi ts (Madsen 2006 calls this the motivation eff ect of active labour market policy).
Although it seems obvious that active labour market policies promote the reintegration of the unemployed in the workforce, the majority of evaluation studies of specifi c programmes show only weak and often negligible eff ects. Some programmes are even found to be counterproductive, due to a locking-in eff ect, which tends to prolong unemployment spells merely because the unemployed individual cannot search for work while participating in an intensive training programme. In their survey of evaluation studies Martin and Grubb (2001) show that only some measures for some particular groups are eff ective, especially for women re-entering the labour market. Kluve (2006) gives an overview of 95 micro-evaluation studies and concludes that 'services and sanctions' (including job search assistance, vocational guidance and counselling) and 'private sector incentive schemes' (such as wage subsidies) are the most eff ective activation programmes (although he does not estimate their average eff ectiveness).
As with unemployment benefi ts, one can also explore the macro-impact of active labour market policies by comparing countries that diff er in their eff orts with respect to their activation policies or by studying changes in such policies in one particular country over time. Once again, one needs to disentangle the eff ect of activation strategies from the eff ect of other factors. Moreover, expenditures on active labour market policies tend to change countercyclically, since spending usually increases as unemployment rises. There is thus a bi-causal relationship between spending on activation and unemployment, which makes it even harder to estimate the impact of active labour market policies on unemployment. The few estimates of the macro-impact of active labour market policies that are available suggest that they only have a small or even negligible impact on the unemployment rate, and an even smaller impact on the employment rate (for an overview, see Kluve 2005, pp. 181-4) .
In sum, although there is broad agreement among policy makers and politicians these days on the desirability of shifting the balance of social expenditure from passive to active labour market policies, the available empirical evidence hardly suggests that this is a promising way to counteract the unintended negative consequences of a generous unemployment insurance system.
THE MISSING LINK: EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION LEGISLATION
Both unemployment benefi ts and active labour market policies aim at softening the unfavourable consequences of unemployment, either by providing income maintenance or by shortening unemployment spells. However, neither kind of policies directly aff ects the functioning of the labour market by reducing the risk of dismissal or increasing the number of people that are hired. This might be one explanation for the small eff ects of active labour market policy found in empirical research. Even if activation policies increase the probability of unemployed individuals getting back to work, it does not aff ect the total number of job hires, and thus might have only a small impact on the aggregate unemployment rate (although there might be a positive indirect eff ect by shifting the unemployment-vacancies curve to the left).
The number of dismissals and job hires and, consequently, the fl ows between employment and non-employment are infl uenced by the regulation of the labour market. Various laws and regulations aff ect these fl ows, including working time regulations and statutory minimum wages, but arguably the most important is employment protection legislation. This legislation states the conditions under which an employer may dismiss an employee. In most countries, employment protection legislation distinguishes permanent or regular contracts from temporary or fi xed-term contracts. Often, there are also diff erent rules and procedures regarding individual dismissals and collective dismissals.
Economic theory predicts that employment protection for permanent contracts has two opposing eff ects. On the one hand, it raises the costs of fi ring an employee and increases job tenure, lowering the infl ow into unemployment, especially during an economic downturn. On the other hand, employment protection makes it more costly to hire someone who one might have to dismiss in the future, and reduces the number of job hires. Consequently, the outfl ow out of unemployment decreases. Theoretically, it is unclear which eff ect is larger and, thus, whether employment protection increases or decreases the unemployment rate. Since employment protection legislation unambiguously reduces the fl ows between employment and unemployment in both directions, it results on average in longer job tenures and longer unemployment spells, hence raising the share of the long-term unemployed (Bentolila and Bertola 1990 ). If protection for permanent contracts is stricter than that for temporary contracts, as is usually the case, this is expected to raise the share of temporary employment in total employment.
These theoretical expectations of the impact of employment protection on (un)employment and (un)employment duration are largely confi rmed by empirical studies (for an overview see the survey by Deelen et al. 2006) . Unemployment protection legislation (EPL) does not signifi cantly aff ect the aggregate employment rate and unemployment rate, but it does reduce the reallocation on the labour market and increases average job tenure and average unemployment duration. Consequently, relaxing employment protection legislation will not raise the employment rate or reduce the unemployment rate, but will only have an impact on the distribution of employment and unemployment over duration classes.
IS THERE AN OPTIMAL COMBINATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS, ACTIVATION POLICIES AND EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION?
Despite the broad consensus on the desirability of shifting the balance of social policies towards active measures, to date there is not much empirical evidence that supports the benefi ts of such a shift. On the one hand, a generous social security system and strict employment protection legislation do not seem to have a large impact on the overall employment or unemployment rate. On the other hand, both evaluation and macrostudies show only small or negligible positive eff ects of active labour market policies. One reason for these small estimated eff ects might be the existence of complementarities between the various measures. The impact of one instrument may very well depend on another instrument. While each policy separately might only have a negligible eff ect, a wellchosen combination of policies might be more eff ective than the sum of the separate policies. There can be various reasons for such complementarities (Blanchard and Tirole 2004; Eichhorst and Konle-Seidl 2005) . If the unemployment benefi t replacement rate is high and eligibility criteria are weak, the obligation to participate in an activation programme might compensate for the disincentives of the benefi t, through the so-called motivation eff ect discussed before (Madsen 2006 ). If benefi t levels are much lower and the incentives to leave unemployment much stronger, the motivation eff ect will not make much diff erence. Mandatory training programmes might thus be more eff ective, the higher the replacement rates are. A high replacement rate also makes it less costly for employers to dismiss workers, since employees will not resist dismissal fi ercely if they only expect to suff er a small income loss. Hence, the employer can shift most of the (social) costs of unemployment on to society. This may result in excessive numbers of dismissals, which can be counterbalanced by strict employment regulation. If replacement rates are low, employment protection might lead to too few dismissals and thus hinder reallocation on the labour market. Furthermore, very strict employment protection might reduce the eff ectiveness of active labour market policies, since there are little job openings and even qualifi ed job seekers might fi nd it diffi cult to fi nd a job. If there are indeed complementarities between the various social policies, then there might be an optimal combination of unemployment insurance, active labour market policies and employment protection that renders the best results in terms of both fl exibility and security. The European Commission states: 'A successful fl exicurity strategy has to balance carefully the income insurance function of the unemployment benefi t system with an appropriate activation strategy designed to facilitate transitions into employment and boost career development' (EC 2007, p. 7) . Recently, it has been suggested that Denmark might be close to such an optimal combination of policies, for which reason some authors even refer to it as the 'golden triangle' (Bredgaard et al. 2005; EC 2007, p. 36) . The three angles of the Danish policy triangle include generous unemployment benefi ts, high spending on active labour market policies and weak employment protection legislation. The fi rst guarantees income maintenance in case of job loss, the second secures a quick return to the labour market for those who lose their job and the third stimulates a fl exible labour market with large fl ows between employment and unemployment.
Although Denmark is one of the best-performing Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries with respect to the employment rate, the unemployment rate and the share of long-term unemployment, one can nevertheless question whether this good performance is really caused by this combination of policies. Does Danish social policy indeed constitute a golden triangle? To date, there are only a few studies that estimate the impact of the combination of various policies on labour market performance. Boone and van Ours (2004) analyse the joint impact of unemployment benefi ts and activation policies and conclude that the eff ect of training on the unemployment rate is larger the higher the replacement rate is. They do not fi nd any complementarities between unemployment benefi ts and other elements of active labour market policies, such as, public employment services and subsidized jobs. However, they do not include employment protection legislation in their analysis. Belot and van Ours (2004) analyse the interaction eff ects of benefi t generosity and tax rates, employment protection and centralization of bargaining, and union density and centralization of bargaining. They conclude that institutions matter and that they interact. The interaction between tax rates and benefi t generosity, in particular, explains the reduction of unemployment rates in most European countries. However, they do not analyse the interaction eff ect of employment protection and unemployment benefi ts, and active labour market policy is left out of their study. Kluve (2006) performs a meta-analysis of micro-evaluation studies of active labour market policies and fi nds that stricter employment protection reduces the likelihood that specifi c labour market programmes are eff ective, but he does not fi nd a signifi cant impact of unemployment benefi t replacement rates. In a study of the OECD (2006) interactions are tested between benefi t replacement rates and employment protection on the one hand and the overall institutional framework (measured by union density, collective bargaining coverage, the extent of corporatism and product market competition) on the other. The conclusion is that 'no fi rm conclusions can be drawn regarding the presence of specifi c interactions between the policies and institutions included in the baseline specifi cation' (OECD 2006, p. 214) . Moreover, it is stated that 'policy complementarities are estimated to amplify the unemployment eff ects of separate reforms by only 12 to 19 per cent' (OECD 2006, p. 216) . However, of the three policy areas discussed above, this part of the analysis only includes unemployment benefi ts. In another analyses the OECD fi nds 'that the adverse impact of unemployment benefi ts is lower in countries that spend more on ALMPs' (OECD 2006, p. 217) .
In conclusion, the empirical evidence for complementarities between various elements of social policy is limited and rather weak. The few available studies do not seem to warrant the existence of a golden triangle, which renders an optimal combination of fl exibility and security. However, none of these studies analyses the possible complementarities between unemployment benefi ts (UBs), active labour market policies (ALMPs) and employment protection legislation simultaneously. Therefore, in the next section we present the results of an explorative empirical analysis that does take all three elements of social policy into account at the same time.
A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE JOINT IMPACT OF UB, ALMP AND EPL For the analysis, we use data for 25 OECD countries covering the period 1985-2004. Data are retrieved from the OECD Labour Force Surveys, the OECD Social Expenditure Database and the CEP-OECD Institutions dataset (see Nickell 2006) . Our analysis diff ers in a number of aspects from that in OECD (2006) and Bassanini and Duval (2006) . We include the three components of the policy triangle and their interaction terms simultaneously. Our main interest is in the long-term impact of policy instruments on structural unemployment and trends in labour market fl ows. Therefore we base our analysis on fi ve-year averages, leaving us with four time periods: 1985-9, 1990-4, 1995-9 and 2000-4 . Consequently, we do not analyse the short-term impact of the various policies on the evolution of the unemployment rate over the business cycle, but the long-term impact on trends in average unemployment rates over consecutive business cycles. Although the use of period averages reduces the number of cases for our analysis, and thus makes it harder to fi nd statistically signifi cant eff ects, if we do fi nd signifi cant eff ects they are more likely to be robust. To faciliate interpretation of the estimated eff ects, we use deviations from the means in the relevant period. 3 As dependent variables we include not only the overall unemployment and employment rates, but also the fl ows between employment and nonemployment. After all, we are especially interested in a mix of policies that increases both security and fl exibility. Labour market fl exibility is better measured by labour market fl ows than by the stocks of employed and unemployed at a particular point in time. As a proxy for these labour market fl ows we take the share of long-term unemployment (unemployed longer than one year), the infl ow into unemployment and the infl ow into employment. The infl ow into unemployment is calculated as the number of persons who are unemployed for less than one month, multiplied by 12, expressed as a percentage of the population aged between 15 and 64. This indicator measures the probability of becoming unemployed within a year for the average member of the working-age population. As a proxy for the infl ow into employment we take the number of persons who are employed for less than one year as a percentage of total employment.
In addition, we construct a new indicator to measure income (in)security or the expected income loss due to unemployment, refl ecting the diff erence in the expected income when unemployed and the average wage. It is calculated as the probability of being unemployed multiplied by the average replacement income during an unemployment spell (which is calculated as total expenditure on unemployment benefi ts divided by the number of unemployed) as a percentage of the average wage. This expected relative replacement income is subtracted from 100 to get the expected relative income loss due to unemployment (refer to the Appendix to this chapter for the technical details). This gives us a proxy for the 'security' part of fl exicurity in each country.
The independent variables included in the models refl ect the three policy instruments discussed above: that is, employment protection, unemployment insurance and active labour market policy. For employment protection legislation we take the OECD Employment Protection Legislation Index (OECD 2004) . To refl ect unemployment insurance we use the average OECD overall gross replacement rates for the fi rst fi ve years of unemployment, summarized over four diff erent family types and three different income levels. Finally, as a proxy for active labour market policies we use the expenditures on active labour market policy expressed as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). This is the only cross-country measure available. However, we acknowledge the problems of bi-causality with active labour market policy and labour market outcomes such as the unemployment rate. In part we try to minimize this problem by using fi ve-year averages. In addition, we try to correct more formally for this by using a two-step analysis (see the Appendix to this chapter for details on this method). In a fi rst regression we estimated the relation between activation policies and GDP growth to fi nd the cyclical part of expenditure on active labour market policy. From this regression we take the country fi xed eff ects, that represent the policy part of the expenditure on active labour market policy, and include these in the analysis for the eff ect of the policy instruments on labour market outcomes. In doing so, we hope to reduce the problem of bi-causality to a minimum.
Apart from estimating the direct eff ects of the three policy variables on the labour market outcomes, we include the interactions between each pair of policy variables, as well as the interaction between the three policy variables. If a golden triangle really exists, we expect this last interaction term in particular to be signifi cant, since that would imply that the full composition of the policy triangle matters. Detailed information on the analyses (such as the methods used, descriptive statistics of the included variables and the exact regression results) can be found in the Appendix to this chapter; Table 1 .1 summarizes the estimation results.
The results of this explorative analysis are illustrative. Our analysis shows hardly any direct eff ects of the policy instruments, only expenditure on activation is positively related to the unemployment rate, the share of long-term unemployment and the expected income loss due to unemployment. The positive relation with the unemployment rate has been found before in the literature, when using this measure for active labour market policy and might still be caused by the bi-causal relation between the two variables (Calmfors et al. 2002) . However, it might also be evidence of the earlier-mentioned locking-in eff ect of activation policies.
Although there are few direct eff ects, the results show a number of interesting bilateral interaction eff ects of the policy variables. First, the interaction between employment protection and unemployment benefi ts is signifi cant in four models. When employment protection is stricter, more generous unemployment benefi ts result in a lower employment rate, a higher unemployment rate, a larger share of long-term unemployment and a larger expected income loss due to unemployment. This was expected from theory, since more strict employment protection reduces the number of job hires and the mobility on the labour market, reducing the exit probability out of unemployment. This latter eff ect is aggravated by more generous unemployment benefi ts, that minimize the negative income eff ects of unemployment, raising the reservation wage. Apparently, the eff ect of the higher unemployment risk on the expected income loss is larger than the eff ect of a higher replacement rate.
Second, the interaction between employment protection and active labour market policy has a signifi cant impact on four of the dependent variables, basically showing the reverse eff ects of the interaction between employment protection and unemployment benefi ts. As the employment protection becomes stricter, spending more on activation policies results in higher employment, lower unemployment, less long-term unemployment and a smaller expected income loss due to unemployment. It seems plausible that the higher activation expenditure off sets the unfavourable impact of strict employment protection (or the reduced fl exibility of the 
Note: For full regression results, see the Appendix of Chapter 1.
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Paul de Beer and Trudie Schils -9781849803274 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 09/10/2019 06:34:33PM via free access labour market). The theoretical expectation of a diminished eff ectiveness of active labour market policies when employment protection is stricter is not supported by our analysis. Thus, it appears that large expenditure on active labour market policy has some unfavourable eff ects if employment protection is average, but has a positive impact if it is strict. Third, there is no signifi cant interaction eff ect of unemployment benefi ts and active labour market policy. This is somewhat surprising since it is generally believed that stronger activation policies can off set the negative eff ects of benefi t generosity on unemployment duration. Finally, the estimation results show hardly any overall interaction eff ect between the three policy instruments, apart from a weakly signifi cant eff ect on the share of long-term unemployment. More strict employment protection combined with higher unemployment benefi t generosity and higher expenditure on active labour market policy is associated with a larger share of long-term unemployed. Interestingly, this occurs in addition to and in the opposite direction of the above-mentioned bilateral interaction between employment protection and expenditure on activation policies. This means that although spending more on activation is more eff ective if employment protection is stricter, this favourable eff ect is weaker the more generous unemployment benefi ts are.
In short, the estimation results show that only employment protection and active labour market policy have a direct eff ect on some of the labour market outcomes, both in an unfavourable direction. The observed bilateral interaction eff ects between the labour market institutions in our analysis on the labour market outcomes suggest that complementarities between the policy instruments exist and should be accounted for in labour market analyses. Moreover, our statistical search for the golden triangle seems to be bogged down. We found only minor interactions between all three angles of the policy triangle. This raises the question whether a golden triangle of social policy that renders an optimal combination of security (low unemployment rate and high income security) and fl exibility (large fl ows between employment and unemployment) exists. However, this should not be interpreted to imply that the social policy mix is irrelevant, since the combination of measures explains roughly between one-third and half of the variance of the dependent variables in our regression analyses.
IMPLEMENTATION AND ADMINISTRATION
There might be various causes for the weak statistical evidence for consistent policy complementarities between the three policies. Before lapsing into the conclusion that the social policy mix has no role at all to play in improving labour market performance and income security, we prefer to examine another possible cause, which is that the indicators used in the statistical analysis are too general and too crude to serve as measures of the subtleties of social policy in practice. Measuring active labour market policy by aggregate public expenditure as a percentage of GDP simply misses the large variety in activation strategies in diff erent countries. For example, spending 0.3 per cent of GDP on subsidized jobs may have a completely diff erent eff ect than spending the same amount on job brokerage or training (Calmfors et al. 2002; Kluve 2006) . Likewise, the OECD employment protection indicator summarizes a wide range of components of labour law into one fi gure. This has led to some criticism, mainly because of the rather crude and subjective coding frame (Bertola et al. 2000) . In addition, the indicator only takes account of national legislation, while in some countries employment protection is further regulated in collective agreements (Schils, 2007) . Two countries scoring equally on the OECD indicator may very well have strongly diverging systems of employment protection. Finally, the overall OECD indicator for the replacement rate is a summary measure of the replacement rate in a number of diff erent situations, but does not include entitlement conditions. Although it would be possible to disaggregate these general indicators into their constituent parts, the number of indicators that are available for a statistical analysis would soon exceed the number of observations, making a statistical analysis impossible. 4 To get a better insight into the impact of these specifi c elements of the policy triangle one has to resort to a qualitative, in-depth analysis of social policy in a number of countries.
A further reason why the indicators used may not be adequate for determining the impact of social policy, is that they only measure the 'intensity' of social policy, in terms of income replacement (UB), spending (ALMP) and rights (EPL), but they do not take into account the way these policies are put into practice. The indicators give no information about the actors that are responsible for implementing and administering these policies.
Which actors are involved in social policy? Most studies and debates since the 1980s have focused on the roles of the state and the market, strongly suggesting that there is a dichotomy with respect to the distribution of responsibility. However, as early as 1985, Streeck and Schmitter (1985) pointed out that there is a third kind of actor involved, namely intermediate organizations or associations, including trade unions and employers' associations. 5 In many countries these so-called social partners have played and still play an important role in social policy. In some countries they merely have an advisory role to the government on social policy, whereas in other countries the trade unions are involved in the actual administration of unemployment insurance (Belgium, Denmark, Sweden). The social partners may play a role in implementing active labour market policies as well, and collective agreements between trade unions and employers (or their associations) may include additional provisions with respect to unemployment benefi ts, employment protection and training measures. However, these extensions of the legal provisions are not included in the indicators used for our statistical analysis.
It is likely that the particular role of the various actors matters quite a lot for the eff ectiveness of social policy. For example, if the actor that pays out unemployment benefi ts is also responsible for implementing active labour market policy, it is more likely that these policies are coordinated and attuned than if diff erent actors are responsible for them. After all, it is more profi table to increase the budget for active labour market policy if one can claw back part of the extra spending by reducing the number of persons who claim unemployment benefi ts. Likewise, if statutory unemployment benefi ts are paid out by a public body while a top-up is administered by the social partners, this might harm the coherence of unemployment insurance policy. Moreover, it is likely that a principalagent problem arises when diff erent actors are responsible for the legislation and the implementation of social policy, since the legislator (the government) and the administrator (an independent body) may not have the same objectives.
The importance of the role of the social partners with respect to policies to promote fl exicurity is acknowledged by the European Commission, as it states: 'active involvement of social partners is key to ensure that fl exi curity delivers benefi ts at all', and: 'Social partners are best placed to address the needs of employers and workers and detect synergies between them' (EC 2007, p. 8) . This makes it essential to take account of the role of the social partners in assessing the impact of social policy. However, hardly any study in this fi eld has paid explicit attention to their role. Therefore, this will be an important contribution of the in-depth country studies in this book.
FROM QUANTITATIVE TO QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS: THE PURPOSE OF THIS BOOK
For the reasons spelled out in the preceding section a purely quantitative, statistical analysis will not do in fi nding out the best combination of unemployment benefi ts, employment protection and active labour market policy to enhance fl exicurity. We have to investigate the peculiarities and idiosyncrasies of social policy in separate countries to determine which characteristics are essential in explaining the successes and failures of these countries with respect to social protection and labour market performance. To accomplish this we have to perform a qualitative, in-depth study of the social policy triangle in each country separately. Therefore, the main part of this book consists of a number of case studies of social policies to tackle the unemployment risk in a selection of European countries. The selection of these countries is based on two principles. First, we include countries that are somewhat similar with respect to their socio-economic context, so that it is likely that diff erences between these countries regarding (income) security and labour market performance are for a considerable part due to diff erences in their social policy. Second, we need suffi cient variation in the kind of social policies and the role of various actors (government, social partners, private companies) to be able to attribute diff erences in performance to these factors. These criteria resulted in the selection of Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
The next seven chapters give an extensive overview and discussion of the social policy triangle in these countries. Each chapter discusses the main changes in each of the three policy areas since the 1990s and then describes the main characteristics of the present policy, including the administration and the distribution of responsibility between the various actors involved. The last part of each chapter discusses the interaction between the three components of the social policy triangle and tries to assess its eff ectiveness with respect to fl exicurity. In the fi nal chapter we compare the design of social policy in the seven countries, establish the main diff erences and similarities and fi nd out whether the social policy mix in the various countries is converging or diverging. Finally, we draw some conclusions from the lessons learned in the country chapters and try to answer the question whether there exists something like a 'golden triangle' after all. NOTES 1. Wilthagen et al. (2003) distinguish employment security from job security, which refers to the security of keeping one's present job, but one could also consider job security to be a specifi c element of employment security. Their fourth element of security is combination security, which refers to the combination of paid work and other, unpaid activities, such as child care. This kind of security will not be discussed in this book. 3. Details on the variables and methods used are presented in the Appendix to this chapter. 4. In some empirical studies (Nickell et al. 2005 ) more explanatory variables are included by using a pooled time-series cross-section analysis in which each year for each country is an observation, which increases the total number of observations strongly. However, such a regression analysis mainly explains the short-term cyclical variation in the dependent variable and does not give much insight into structural shifts in the long run. 5. Streeck and Schmitter (1985) include community as a fourth actor, but this actor will be left aside in our study.
Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies working paper no. 56, Amsterdam. Streeck, W. and P.C. Schmitter (1985) , 'Community, market, state -and associations? The prospective contribution of interest governance to social order', European Sociological Review, 1(2 Table 1A .1 shows data availability for these countries.
To estimate the eff ect of the policy instruments of interest on several labour market outcomes, the following three linear regression models are used:
where j 5 1, . . ., 25 is the number of the countries; t 5 1, . . ., 4 is the number of the time periods, a j are the country fi xed-eff ects, a t are the period fi xedeff ects, Y jt is a set of dependent variables, X jt is a set of independent variables and h jt is the error term. The set of dependent variables consists of the employment rate (employed population as a percentage of total population aged between 15 and 64), unemployment rate (number of unemployed as a percentage of the labour force), share of long-term unemployment (percentage of unemployed with unemployment spell longer than one year), infl ow into unemployment (number of people with unemployment spell less than one month multiplied by 12, as a percentage of the labour force), infl ow into employment (number of people with employment spell shorter than one year as a percentage of total employed) and the expected income loss due to unemployment (the probability of being unemployed multiplied by the average replacement income during an unemployment spell -which is calculated as total expenditure on unemployment benefi ts divided by the number of unemployed -as a percentage of the average wage 1 ).
The set of independent variables consists of the OECD employment protection indicator (measuring the strictness of EPL on 18 items, ranging (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) and SLK (1994 SLK ( -2004 . Unemployment rate from 1 to 6), unemployment benefi t generosity (OECD gross summary replacement rate over four diff erent family types and three diff erent income levels), and active labour market policy (expenditure as a percentage of GDP). Table 1A .2 shows the summary statistics for the relevant time periods, including means, minimum and maximum level. As mentioned, we used a two-step analysis for the active labour market policy variable to reduce the problem of bi-causality. We fi rst regressed the following model: ALMP jt 5 b 0 1 b 1 (GDP jt 2 GDP j,t21 ) 1 m j 1 u jt where b 1 represents the cyclical part of expenditures on active labour market policy in country j, whereas m j is the country fi xed-eff ect and u jt is the error term. From this regression we calculate the so-called policy part of expenditures on active labour market policy, taking only the country fi xed eff ect and the error term, and we include this variable in our models explained before (also included in the summary statistics in Table 1A .2). Table 1A .3 presents the regression results. via free access NOTE 1. In formula: I 5 u (1 − (B/Nu)/(W/N(1−u))) 5 u − (1−u)B/W, in which u is the unemployment rate, B is total expenditure on unemployment benefi ts, W is the total wage bill, and N is the labour force. 
